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Abstract: 
Given the threats of our current ‘risk society’, there is an ever-increasing demand for safety 
regulation to counter the harmful effects of an equally growing number of dangerous 
activities. Claims for more safety and security abound, ranging from concerns about people 
killed in traffic accidents and consumers harmed by unsafe products to anxiety about 
environmental disasters (global warming) and terrorism. This state of affairs poses difficult 
issues for policy makers. While government resources are necessarily limited, demands for 
safety and security are in principle without bounds. It is thus unavoidable that difficult 
choices must be made and priorities must be set. 
The Law and Economics literature has developed a comprehensive normative framework to 
prescribe optimal legal policies when individuals behave rationally. It is well established that 
enforcement agents should not aim at a minimum level of violations of legal norms but at an 
optimal level. The main goal of this paper is to apply the insights from the Law and 
Economics literature on optimal law enforcement to the area of safety regulation. Our paper 
distinguishes between the form of the sanctions (monetary versus non-monetary), the role of 
private parties versus public agents in enforcement (e.g. group actions), the timing of the 
enforcement measures (preclusion, act-based sanctions and harm-based sanctions) and the 
division of competencies between central enforcement authorities and decentralized 
enforcement agencies. Furthermore, we discuss several criticisms on the rational choice 
model (especially related to terrorism) and briefly discuss compliance strategies as alternative 
approach to deterrence strategies. 
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OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT OF SAFETY LAW 
 
Roger Van den Bergh 
Louis Visscher 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
Given the threats of our current ‘risk society’, there is an ever-increasing demand for safety 
regulation to counter the harmful effects of an equally growing number of dangerous activi-
ties. Claims for more safety and security abound, ranging from concerns about people killed 
in traffic accidents and consumers harmed by unsafe products to anxiety about environmental 
disasters (global warming) and terrorism. This state of affairs poses difficult issues for policy 
makers. While government resources are necessarily limited, demands for safety and security 
are in principle without bounds. It is thus unavoidable that difficult choices must be made and 
priorities must be set. The latter applies to both the formulation of substantive rules and the 
domain of enforcement. Given the uncertainties, the complexities and the high interests at 
stake, policy makers face great difficulties if they want to establish safety laws that are effi-
cient from a cost-benefit perspective. In the case of catastrophic risks, the adoption of the 
precautionary principle indicates that the law should err on the side of environmental preser-
vation.1 In other areas of law, such as traffic safety and consumer protection, the risk of coun-
terproductive safety measures has been documented empirically.2 These examples show that 
policy makers face difficulties in prioritizing risks in a way that scarce resources are not 
wasted and in avoiding the implementation of safety regulations that have worse conse-
quences than the risks they are supposed to deal with. These problems will not be discussed 
further in this paper. Rather, the main focus will be on the challenges in the area of enforce-
ment. Optimal outcomes require the choice of an appropriate sanction in case of violation of 
safety rules. This sanction must be imposed timely and at the optimal level of government. 
Moreover, since resources of public authorities are inevitably limited, the potential role of 
private enforcement equally has to be considered.  
 
The Law and Economics literature has developed a comprehensive normative framework to 
prescribe optimal legal policies when individuals behave rationally. The economic approach 
to law provides important insights for policy makers who wish to achieve ‘optimal deter-
rence’. Economic analysis of crime has been concerned with individual deterrence from the 
perspective of a rational individual actor, who maximizes his or her individual benefits. Fol-
lowing the basic insights from Gary Becker, potential criminals commit an offence if the  
gains from committing the crime are larger than the expected costs in terms of probability 
and severity of punishment.3 In addition, at the level of society, it is well established that en-
forcement agents should not aim at a minimum level of violations of legal norms but at an 
optimal level. Benefits of more enforcement have to be weighed against the costs of en-
                                                 
1  A. Arcuri, ‘The case for a procedural version of the precautionary principle erring on the side of environ-
mental preservation’, in:  M. Boyer, Y. Hiriart, and D. Martimort (Eds.), Frontiers in the Economics of Envi-
ronmental Regulation and Liability, Hampshire: Ashgate 2006, p. 19-63. 
2  S. Peltzman, ‘The effects of automobile safety regulation’, (83) Journal of Political Economy 1975, p. 677-
725; W.K. Viscusi, ‘The lulling effect: The impact of child resistant packaging on aspirin and analgesic in-
gestions’, (74) American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings 1984, p. 325; W.K. Viscusi, Fatal 
Trade-Offs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk, New York: Oxford University Press 1992. 
3  G.S. Becker, ‘Crime and punishment: an economic approach’, (76) Journal of Political Economy 1968, p. 
169-217.  
forcement measures and enforcement efforts should thus be increased only up to the point 
where their marginal costs equal the marginal benefits. It is socially desirable to allow a cer-
tain degree of unsafe, norm breaking behaviour if the costs of avoiding violations are higher 
than the benefits of additional deterrence. The main goal of this paper is to apply the insights 
from the Law and Economics literature on optimal law enforcement to the area of safety 
regulation. 
 
The structure of this paper follows Shavell’s distinction of the three basic dimensions accord-
ing to which methods of law enforcement can differ: the form of the sanctions, the role of 
private parties versus public agents in enforcement, and the timing of the enforcement meas-
ures.4 In a federal or quasi-federal context, such as the European Union, a fourth dimension 
must be added: the division of competencies between central enforcement authorities and de-
centralized enforcement agencies. The question addressed in the second section of the paper 
relates to the sanctions. A basic choice is to be made between monetary sanctions (private 
damages, administrative fines, criminal fines) and imprisonment. Generally, if sanctions are 
too low, the expected benefits from violating the safety rules may exceed the expected costs 
of infringing the law and under-deterrence will result. The third section discusses the question 
relating to the enforcement agents: not only public enforcement authorities but also private 
parties bringing cases before courts can play an important role in the enforcement of safety 
rules. The third section examines the advantages and disadvantages of private enforcement to 
find out whether, from an efficiency perspective, private damages actions are an alternative 
for or a desirable supplement to enforcement by public authorities. The question discussed in 
the fourth section of the paper relates to the timing of the enforcement measures. Intervention 
may take place before a dangerous act is committed, after the occurrence of the undesirable 
act, or after harm has been inflicted upon society. The fourth section gives an overview of the 
theoretical economic literature, which sheds some light on these questions, and applies the 
insights to particular areas of safety law. The fifth section of this paper discusses the fourth 
question relating to the choice between a centralized enforcement system by a single public 
authority and decentralized enforcement by different agencies at lower levels of government. 
Decentralized enforcement implies shared competences and may enable competition between 
enforcement agencies. Whether this regulatory competition at the enforcement level is benign 
is the last question to be addressed in the fifth section. All insights on optimal enforcement of 
safety laws that are developed in sections 2 to 5 are based on the rational choice model used 
in the economic analysis of law. The sixth section of the paper pays some attention to the 
criticisms on this rational choice model and briefly discusses alternative approaches. Finally, 
the most important conclusions are summarized in the seventh section of the paper. 
 
  
2. The choice of the sanction 
 
2.1 Unsafety as negative externality 
 
Several dangerous activities generate harmful effects to persons who do not engage in those 
activities. Examples include traffic accidents, products causing losses, dangers at work due to 
unsafe machines or materials used, and environmental losses. In economic terms, these dan-
gers form negative externalities, i.e. costs borne by others than the parties causing them. If an 
actor does not have to bear the full costs of his activity, (s)he will take the wrong decisions in 
                                                 
4  S. Shavell, ‘The optimal structure of law enforcement’, (36) Journal of Law and Economics 1993, p. 255-
287. 
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deciding how often to engage in the activity and how carefully to do this. Viewed from the 
perspective of maximizing social welfare, (s)he will engage too often in dangerous activities 
and will not take sufficient care. The actor will only reduce the activity level if the private 
losses resulting from the activity decrease by more than the foregone benefits, and (s)he will 
only take more care if the decrease in personal expected accident losses outweighs the in-
crease in care costs. In this calculation, the actor neglects the costs (s)he imposes on third par-
ties, which from a societal point of view should be incorporated just as well. Legal instru-
ments can be used to let the actor internalize the externality, so that (s)he will better weigh 
costs and benefits of taking care, and/or choose a better activity level. It may be added that in 
the case of intentional torts, crimes and terrorist attacks, the negative externalities are not 
caused inadvertently, but on purpose. The actor therefore does not spend too little on taking 
care, but (s)he actually spends resources to enable the dangerous act. In essence, care costs 
are negative.5 This in itself is already a waste of resources, so that the act lowers social wel-
fare. Furthermore, the acts often cause more losses to the victim than gains to the actor, 
which further reduces social welfare.6
 
Tort law, regulation and criminal law all provide behavioural norms, which can help in in-
creasing social welfare. Tort law provides rules to evaluate whether an actor has taken 
enough care while engaged in his or her activities (negligence) or it shifts the losses to this 
actor irrespective of the care level chosen (strict liability). Regulation provides detailed 
norms as to how actors should behave, which safety measures they should take, which diplo-
mas and training they need, and it opens the possibility of sanctioning actors who do not meet 
the requirements. Criminal law poses monetary and non-monetary sanctions on undesired be-
haviour. Hence, different legal instruments to enhance safety exist. Enforcement of the be-
havioural norms can reduce the number and/or severity of violations of these norms, because 
the actor who considers such a violation is confronted with the possibility of a sanction, 
which lowers his or her net private benefits. This deterrence potential is the central focus of 
the economic analysis of safety law.7  Different legal instruments use different types of sanc-
tions to achieve deterrence. In the section below these sanctions will be discussed and com-
pared in detail.  
 
2.2  Internalization through damages, fines and imprisonment: an economic appraisal 
 
In order to induce actors to make a correct weighing of all costs and benefits of their activi-
ties, the externalities should be fully internalized. Only then will actors incorporate all rele-
vant costs and benefits in their decisions. This implies that the size of the sanction should 
vary with the size of the externalities caused. Tort law, regulation and criminal law differ in 
the way in which internalization is aimed for. 
 
2.2.1 Damages 
 
The principal remedies in tort law are damages and injunctions. Both remedies have the po-
tential to deter the potential wrongdoer from the dangerous act. An injunction is a direct way 
                                                 
5  R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (6th edition), New York: Aspen Publishers 2003, p. 206. 
6  D.D. Ellis, ‘An economic theory of intentional torts: a comment’, (3) International Review of Law and Eco-
nomics 1983, p. 50. 
7  Obviously, in as far as the sanction consists of the obligation to pay tort damages, the victim is compensated 
for the loss suffered. This goal, which is regarded as the central goal of tort law by many lawyers, will not be 
further discussed in this paper, as the focus is on the potential of the different legal instruments to enhance 
safety by deterring norm-breaking behaviour.  
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to prevent the behaviour, by simply forbidding it. Obviously, the potential injurer might de-
cide to carry out his behaviour after all, so that an additional sanction is needed to enforce the 
injunction. Damages form an indirect deterrence instrument, designed to induce the actor to 
increase the care level and/or to lower the activity level. The literature on economic analysis 
of tort law is very extensive8 and cannot be dealt with in detail within the confines of this 
contribution. However, a short discussion of efficient liability rules in cases of unilateral ac-
cidents (where the victim has no impact on the expected accident losses) may suffice to illus-
trate the way in which liability rules may contribute to achieve an optimal level of safety.  
Under a rule of strict liability, the injurer is always liable and therefore always bears the costs 
of care and the costs of the accidents that still occur at this care level. The injurer will there-
fore spend an additional euro on care as long as this yields at least one euro in decreased ex-
pected accident costs. Hence, (s)he will take the optimal care level where the sum of care 
costs and expected accident losses is minimized. Furthermore, because the injurer internalizes 
both the care costs as well as the expected accident losses, (s)he will only engage in the activ-
ity if these costs are lower than the utility yielded by the activity. Hence, (s)he also chooses 
an optimal activity level. Under a negligence rule, if the courts base the due care level on a 
proper weighing of costs and benefits of care, the injurer also chooses the optimal care level. 
It is cheaper for him/her to take due care and not be liable, than to take less than due care and 
be liable. If courts place the due care level higher or lower than the optimal care level, how-
ever, the injurer will follow this incorrect due care level if (s)he can predict it. If the injurer 
cannot predict the error of the court, (s)he will most likely take excessive care, to lower the 
chance of being held liable and having to bear the expected accident costs.9 In any case, by 
taking due care, the injurer avoids having to bear the expected accident losses. The injurer 
therefore externalizes these costs onto the victim. As a result, his or her activity level will be 
higher than optimal. 
 
The behavioural incentives provided by the tort system flow from the duty to pay damages. 
Therefore, in order for tort law to lead to optimal deterrence, tort damages under strict liabil-
ity should lead to full internalization, and under negligence they have to be high enough to 
make optimal care (which is based on full internalization) more attractive than lower care 
plus liability. Unfortunately, tort law suffers from some problems, which endanger the ideal 
of optimal damages.  
First, the ‘probability of conviction’, i.e. the probability that an injurer who has committed a 
tort will actually have to pay damages, will be lower than 100 percent. Some victims might 
not file a claim, e.g. because they think that they will not be able to prove negligence, causa-
tion and/or their losses, or the costs of bringing a claim outweigh the damages that might re-
sult. The latter problem is known as ‘rational apathy’: victims do not sue injurers because it is 
not worth the efforts. As it will be argued in Section 3 below, collective actions might ame-
liorate this situation. If the probability of conviction is below 100 percent, injurers are not 
confronted with all expected losses they cause and they receive inadequate incentives, which 
leads to under-deterrence. This problem might be solved by using punitive damages, where 
the damages are multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability of conviction. However, many 
                                                 
8  See, among many others R.D. Cooter and T.S. Ulen, Law and Economics (4th Edition), Boston: Pearson Ad-
dison Wesley 2004, p. 307-387; Posner 2003, op.cit (note 5), p.167-213; S. Shavell, Economic Analysis of 
Accident Law, 1987, Cambridge: Harvard University Press; S. Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of 
Law, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2004, p. 175-287 and H.-B. 
Schäfer and C. Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2004, p. 107-269. 
9  J.E. Calfee and R. Craswell, ‘Some effects of uncertainty on compliance with legal standards’, (70) Virginia 
Law Review 1984, p. 965-1003; R. Craswell and J.E. Calfee, ‘Deterrence and uncertain legal standards’, (2) 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 1986, p. 279-303. Only if due care is set at an extremely high 
level, the injurer may prefer to take optimal care and accept liability in case of an accident. 
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countries do not accept punitive damages. Without this instrument, the maximum financial 
sanction in tort law is limited to the extent of the losses. 
A second problem is caused by the possibility that the injurer is ‘judgment proof’, meaning 
that he cannot pay the full damages. Especially in situations where the injurer might cause 
large losses, this problem can create severe under-deterrence, and it is exacerbated when us-
ing punitive damages. If the injurer cannot pay the damages, (s)he receives inadequate finan-
cial incentives. The injurer does not incorporate the full expected accident losses in his or her 
care- and activity decision, but merely the expected liability, which is based on his or her 
lower assets. Vicarious liability might solve this problem, provided that the principal has 
adequate assets, and non-financial incentives to influence the agent. In cases where the prin-
cipal (e.g., an employer) has better information regarding the costs and benefits of care meas-
ures and/or the applicable norms of behaviour than the agent (e.g., an employee), vicarious 
liability enables the former to provide better incentives to the latter than tort liability could 
have done. However, vicarious liability creates monitoring costs, because the principal has to 
supervise the agent in order to be able to determine his or her care level.10 The better incen-
tives have to be weighed against the increased system costs. 
Third, not all losses caused by the injurer might be compensated. Especially immaterial 
losses (such as pain and suffering, loss of life, et cetera) and highly subjective and/or uncer-
tain losses (such as the personal valuation of a unique good that has been destroyed, and the 
loss of future income) are likely to be undercompensated, due to their uncertain and specula-
tive nature. 
 
2.2.2 Administrative fines 
 
Administrative fines are financial sanctions imposed by a governmental authority after a 
norm violation has been established. Regulation forms an ex ante approach, where govern-
ments issue more or less detailed behavioural norms, as opposed to the ex post character of 
tort law. In cases where the government possesses superior information as compared to the 
courts, regulation can provide better guidelines for behaviour than strict tort liability or negli-
gence can. Comparable to tort law, regulation can prohibit a certain dangerous behaviour 
(e.g. by withholding a necessary permit) or it can make a norm violation financially unattrac-
tive, by subjecting it to a fine. The magnitude of the fine is not limited to the losses the in-
jurer might cause by his or her violation. Fines therefore have a more flexible character than 
tort damages, because the magnitude can be varied.11 Furthermore, fines can be attached to 
norm breaking behaviour, irrespective whether losses have occurred, and/or to harmful be-
haviour. Tort damages can only be attached to the latter. This difference will be analyzed in 
more detail in section 4 on the timing of sanctions. Besides the possible superior information 
of the government, economies of scale form an additional advantage of regulation. After all, 
the government can investigate into the risks of certain activities, and convey the information 
to actors who themselves could not have afforded this research. 
 
A disadvantage of regulation, as compared to tort law, is the fact that the regulator might be 
susceptible to the influence of interest groups. If these groups are able to influence the deci-
sion making process, the resulting regulation might not succeed in internalizing all external-
ities, but might rather advance the interests of successful pressure groups, possibly to the det-
                                                 
10  R. H. Kraakman, ‘Vicarious and corporate civil liability’, in: B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest (Eds.), Encyclo-
pedia of Law and Economics. Volume II. Civil Law and Economics, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2000, p. 670, 
671. 
11  G. De Geest and G. Dari-Mattiacci, ‘On the intrinsic superiority of regulation plus insurance over tort law’, 
Working paper Utrecht University, Institute of Economics 2003. 
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riment of social welfare. Furthermore, in issuing regulation, the government often has to rely 
in part on information issued by the parties who are regulated. They might only provide the 
information that is beneficial to them. This problem is known as regulatory capture.12 Fi-
nally, fines suffer from the judgment proof problem just as damages do. If the norm violator 
cannot pay the fine, (s)he will not be deterred by it. An important difference in this respect is 
that fines can be based on the norm violation, whereas damages can be attached only to the 
occurrence of losses. Because not all norm violations lead to losses, the sanction on norm 
violation can be lower than the sanction on harmful behaviour, so that the judgment proof 
problem is less severe with the former type of sanction.13
 
2.2.3 Criminal fines and imprisonment 
 
In his seminal paper Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach published in 1968, Gary 
Becker distinguishes several factors that are relevant in determining optimal enforcement in 
criminal law. The first factor is the harm caused by the crimes, i.e. the negative externalities 
diminished by the gain of the offender. The second factor is the costs of apprehension and 
conviction. The third factor, the supply of offenses, depends on the probability of apprehen-
sion and conviction and the severity of the sanction. An increase in the probability appears to 
have a greater effect than an increase in the punishment. Also factors such as income and 
law-abidingness due to education are relevant. The last factor is the total costs of punishment, 
which comprise the cost to offenders plus the cost or minus the gains to others. According to 
Becker, the criminal justice system should aim at minimizing the total social costs of crime.14
 
Criminal fines, just as administrative fines and damages, are financial sanctions that seek to 
deter an actor from committing a wrongful act. They have the same flexibility as administra-
tive fines, in the sense that their magnitude and timing are not restricted to the size and the 
occurrence of losses. However, being involved in a criminal procedure causes negative repu-
tational effects and after a conviction, the actor might have a criminal record, which can have 
negative consequences for an extended period. Hence, criminal fines might be experienced as 
more serious than administrative fines. In terms of deterrence, this can give criminal fines an 
advantage over administrative fines, because it is not only the money-value that is decisive, 
but also the negative associations that are attached to them.15 These negative associations of 
criminal law, however, form an important reason to use criminal sanctions as an ultimum 
remedium, so that criminal fines should only be applied if administrative fines do not produce 
the desired result. In section 2.3 regarding enforcement costs this issue will be discussed in 
more detail. 
 
Imprisonment is a non-financial sanction, and therefore it radically differs from damages and 
fines. This difference provides a possible solution to the judgment proof problem. After all, 
an actor that cannot pay damages or a fine might be deterred by the prospect of possible im-
prisonment. Furthermore, the fact that criminal sanctions, especially imprisonment, are re-
garded as highly intrusive can solve the problem of a low probability of conviction. The 
negative association that people generally have with criminal activities can already prevent 
them from engaging in such activities. However, this requires that criminal rules remain ex-
                                                 
12  M.E. Levine, ‘Regulatory capture’, in: P. Newman (Ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the 
Law. Volume 3, London: Macmillan 1998, p. 267-271. 
13  Shavell 1993, op.cit (note 4), p. 261 ff. 
14  Becker 1969, op.cit (note 3). 
15 Also see A. Ogus and C. Abbott, ‘Sanctions for pollution: do we have the right regime?’, (14) Journal of En-
vironmental Law 2002, p. 287 and 292. 
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ceptional. The more types of undesired behavior are treated as crimes, the less this ‘self-
enforcement’ will occur. 
 
2.3 Enforcement costs 
 
An important topic in the literature regarding optimal enforcement is that the enforcement 
costs should not outweigh the benefits in terms of deterrence. Society should therefore not 
strive for maximal enforcement, but for optimal enforcement. This implies that some norm 
violations have to be accepted, simply because it is too expensive to also deter these viola-
tions. Furthermore, information on the behaviour of the actors and the consequences thereof 
is needed to internalize externalities. It is more or less costly to acquire and process the nec-
essary information, and these costs also have to be taken into account when choosing the in-
ternalization instrument(s) and when determining the desired rate of compliance. The meth-
ods of internalization described above differ in the enforcement costs they entail.  
 
Tort law is regarded as a relatively cheap instrument, because it uses open norms that are 
easy to formulate and that only have to be specified after an accident has happened, i.e. ex 
post. Given that many cases are settled outside of court, or are dealt with administratively by 
insurance companies, the system costs will be relatively low. In cases that are being tried, the 
costs of lawyers and courts will increase the system costs. Since the predominant actor in tort 
law is the victim, who has to sue the injurer, there are no or only little monitoring costs. Even 
though tort law may be regarded as relatively cheap to achieve deterrence, research suggests 
that it is much more costly as a method to compensate harm. For every euro that is paid in 
compensation to the victim, an additional euro has been spent on system costs. This makes 
tort law much more expensive than a pure insurance scheme, where assessments of the sys-
tem costs vary from one to fifteen percent. However, a pure insurance scheme might score 
worse on deterrence.16
 
Regulation causes higher system costs than tort law. To start with, formulating detailed ex 
ante norms is much more expensive than formulating the open ex post norm of careful behav-
iour in tort law. Furthermore, because regulations are issued by different authorities, prob-
lems of inconsistency can occur (e.g. fire regulation requires the doors of a day-care center to 
be unlocked, while regulation regarding the safety of the children requires them to be locked 
so that the children cannot leave the building). Third, the ex ante character of regulation re-
quires monitoring of all behaviour, including both norm abiding and norm violating acts. For 
example, not only speeding motorists are checked but all motorists, and not only carnivals 
with unsafe equipment are visited, but also carnivals where everything turns out to be safe. 
Theoretically, the costs of monitoring could be decreased by reducing the level of monitoring 
while increasing the magnitude of the fine, but the judgment proof problem poses limits to 
this solution. 
 
Criminal law entails even higher enforcement costs than regulation. The negative impact of a 
conviction on the actor involved, such as the reputational loss or stigma, the possible impact 
on work and personal relations and time going to waste during imprisonment, calls for proce-
dural safeguards to avoid wrongful convictions. The punitive element lowers social welfare, 
because there is no offsetting gain. This problem is larger with imprisonment than with fines, 
because a fine is a transfer of money, while imprisonment creates additional harm. The nega-
                                                 
16  See e.g. D. Dewees, D. Duff and M.J. Trebilcock, Exploring the Domain of Accident Law. Taking the Facts 
Seriously, New York: Oxford University Press 1996, p. 26. 
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tive consequences of a wrongful conviction, especially when imprisonment is involved, are 
regarded as much more serious than the negative consequences of a wrongful acquittal in 
criminal law. In administrative law and tort law, the difference between such type 1 and type 
2 errors is much less severe, so that fewer safeguards are needed here. Due to the safeguards 
in the criminal procedure, authorities have to collect more information in order to secure a 
conviction. This increases the enforcement costs. Furthermore, imprisonment is a costly sanc-
tion, because it requires special buildings and trained guards. The officials involved should be 
monitored themselves, to avoid abuse of power. 
 
It is an interesting question whether the high costs of criminal law could be reduced by ‘pri-
vatization’ of criminal law. After all, it is generally argued that private firms operate more 
efficiently than the government does, due to the forces of competition. Government officials 
receive no or only little incentives to produce efficiently, and ‘customers’ who are not 
charged with the full costs of a service (e.g. police) will demand too much of this service. 
Furthermore, due to differences in preferences and ability to pay for safety, the desired level 
of safety might differ per person. The price mechanism is better able to fine-tune the supply 
of safety to those differences, than the government can, simply because the government lacks 
the necessary information.17 With fines, private monitoring agencies could be allowed to re-
tain (part of) the fine, making it a profitable enterprise. With imprisonment, the firms could 
be rewarded for every conviction that was dependent on their efforts.  
 
However, privatization of safety also poses problems. First, there is a risk of a too high level 
of prosecutions. In the economic model, probability of conviction and magnitude of the sanc-
tion are negatively correlated, because it is the expected sanction (probability times magni-
tude) that is decisive. A private firm, however, will be induced to increase the probability of 
conviction if the sanction (which determines their reward) is higher.18 Overall private en-
forcement could also turn out to be lower than public enforcement, because private firms will 
only be willing to invest in enforcement if they can at least break even.19 Second, private 
firms might have no incentive to incorporate the interests of the suspects in their decisions, 
while in Becker’s model on the economics of crime and punishment these interests do have to 
be taken into account in determining the proper enforcement policy.20 On the other hand, pri-
vate firms are susceptible to negative publicity and possible tort claims arising from mal-
treatment. Empirical evidence regarding private prisons indicates that they function more ef-
ficiently than public prisons, and that the inmates are generally treated better.21 Third, it is 
undesirable if several private firms compete on a market where a monopolist would be more 
efficient, due to e.g. the need for one centralized database with fingerprints, DNA-samples et 
cetera (a so-called ‘natural monopoly’). Even if fierce competition would lead to one surviv-
ing monopolist in the end, it remains to be seen if a private monopoly is preferable over a 
public monopoly, especially because it entails the exclusive right to apply force.22
                                                 
17  H.O. Kerkmeester, ‘Privatisering van veiligheid: economische aspecten’, in: L.C. Winkel et al. (red.), Priva-
tisering van veiligheid, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2005, p. 86, 87. 
18  W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, ‘The private enforcement of law’, (4) Journal of Legal Studies 1975, p. 9 ff. 
Friedman argues that Landes and Posner did not prove that private enforcement would lead to over enforce-
ment, because they merely distinguish situations of over enforcement and under enforcement, but do not es-
tablish that the former is more likely to occur than the latter. See D.D. Friedman, ‘Efficient institutions for the 
private enforcement of law’, (13) Journal of Legal Studies 1984, p. 384. 
19  A.M. Polinsky, ‘Private versus public enforcement of fines’, (9) Journal of Legal Studies 1980, p. 113 ff.  
20  Becker 1968, op.cit (note 3), p. 173 and 180. 
21  See Kerkmeester 2005, op.cit (note 17), p. 90, referring to A. Tabarrok (Ed.), Changing the Guard: Private 
Prisons and the Control of Crime, Oakland: The Independent Institute 2003. 
22  Kerkmeester 2005, op.cit (note 17), p. 84. 
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Ogus and Abbot have analyzed the use of sanctions for pollution in England and Wales, by 
applying the insights regarding optimal enforcement. The Environment Agency has the 
power to start criminal proceedings, but this is rarely done, due to the high safeguards in 
criminal law. Only if the Agency  “is satisfied that there is sufficient, admissible and reliable 
evidence that the offence has been committed and there is a realistic prospect of conviction”, 
a prosecution will be started.23 The Agency also can apply the administrative tools of suspen-
sion and revocation of a permit. However, this is regarded as such a heavy sanction - the au-
thors compare it to incapacitation of the offender-  that the threat to apply it is not considered 
as credible.24 Criminal sanctions are often regarded as more intrusive than administrative 
sanctions, but in pollution cases, suspension and revocation are actually more severe than a 
criminal fine. The traditional safeguards of criminal law are not necessary for criminal fines 
in a regulatory setting, because the defendants are mostly firms and the stigma may not be 
serious.25 The authors therefore advocate introduction of administrative fines, which would 
provide the Agency with a credible sanction.26 On the other hand, due to the severity of ad-
ministrative suspension and revocation, the same procedural safeguards as in criminal law 
should apply there and they should only be used if fines are not effective.27
 
3. Public or private enforcement 
 
The Law and Economics literature has advanced criteria that allow an assessment of the rela-
tive efficiency of private and public enforcement of law. Both private and public enforcement 
have a number of strengths and weaknesses. Two determinants allow to make an informed 
choice between public or private enforcement, – or opt for a combination of both. The first 
criterion relates to the availability of information concerning law infringements and the iden-
tity and location of the wrongdoer. The second criterion refers to the need to exclude both 
under-enforcement and over-enforcement. Private enforcement will be economically optimal 
if: i) private parties possess information on violations of safety protection laws and ii) the 
private interests of going to court coincide with the socially optimal enforcement level. Con-
versely, public enforcement is preferable to private enforcement if: i) public agents enjoy an 
information advantage over private parties in discovering infringements of safety rules, or ii) 
the private motives to bring law suits are not identical with the social benefits of law en-
forcement.  
 
At the outset, it should be pointed out that both criteria in favour of either private or public 
enforcement may not be simultaneously satisfied. Private parties possessing information 
about infringements may not have incentives to initiate legal proceedings if the costs of en-
forcement exceed the benefits (for example, in cases of trivial damages). This ‘rational apa-
thy’ problem will lead to under-enforcement. Private parties may also expand their enforce-
ment activities beyond the socially optimal level for opportunistic reasons. In cases where 
there is a risk of suboptimal enforcement, it may be preferable to opt for a combination of 
both systems of enforcement, so that they can mitigate each other’s disadvantages. Below, 
both criteria for choosing between public and private enforcement will be discussed in more 
detail and applied to the domain of safety regulation. 
 
                                                 
23  Ogus and Abbott 2002, op.cit (note 15), p. 287. 
24  Idem, p. 294. 
25  Idem, p. 294. 
26  Idem, p. 296. 
27  Idem, p. 298. 
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3.1. Information advantages of public enforcement agencies 
 
In designing an economically optimal system of enforcement, the first determinant is the 
availability of information. If private parties can easily discover law infringements, other 
things being equal, then it is not socially desirable to have the state spend its resources on en-
forcement activities. By contrast, if it is very difficult and/or costly to discover infringements 
and identify law infringers and the location of the infringements, then public enforcement 
may be more adequate.  
 
In a typical tort case, the victim knows the injurer or the costs of identifying the injurer are 
low.28 Private parties initially possess information unknown to the state about the identity or 
location of liable parties, or even about the occurrence of an accident in the first place. The 
victim will usually have incentives to supply this information to the courts in order to be able 
to collect damages. Society would spend its resources needlessly if it was relying on the state 
to report harms leading to civil liability. However, the picture may change if safety regula-
tions are violated. First, it may be difficult for individual victims to recognize unsafe products 
in markets characterized by information asymmetries. Second, victims will often remain un-
aware of infringements before harm has occurred. Public enforcement will be preferable if it 
is costly to identify the infringement and/or the law infringer. From an economic perspective, 
it can be easily understood why enforcement of regulation of safety and health is primarily 
public. Private parties are not aware of the full size of the risks. If a restaurant kitchen is un-
clean but a consumer does not get sick when he goes to the restaurant, how will (s)he know 
the status of the kitchen? The state will need to spend resources on public enforcement, in 
order to guarantee that law infringers are identified and sanctioned. Another example is the 
requirement of a permit to operate a factory, which is delivered conditional upon the compli-
ance with environmental regulations. Individuals may be unaware of the licence requirements 
and face great difficulties in controlling compliance with e.g. the very technical requirements 
regarding emission of dangerous substances. Private individuals largely remain unaware of 
violations of those rules as long as no (substantial) harm has occurred and, even afterwards, 
will face difficulties to prove violation of the relevant safety rules. Conversely, public en-
forcement agencies may build up expertise in controlling compliance with technically com-
plex safety rules and may be given investigative powers to detect infringements. 
 
3.2. The social benefits of enforcement deviate from the private benefits 
 
Generally, legal rules do not only protect the private interests of harmed individual parties but 
also the interests of society at large. From an economic perspective, the full social losses 
must be compensated to force tortfeasors to internalize the negative welfare effects of their 
behaviour. However, private parties will initiate legal proceedings only if the private benefits 
of doing so are higher than the private costs. The private costs consist of the information 
costs that must be borne to discover the law infringements, the costs of the court procedure 
and the costs to prove the size of the damage and the causal link between the infringement 
and the harm. The private benefits consist of the monetary sanction imposed on the law of-
fenders (assuming that there is no judgement proof problem)29, as far as this will improve the 
financial situation of the private claimants. This private cost-benefit calculus has no system-
atic relation with the social costs and benefits. The social costs also comprise the harm suf-
fered by victims who do not sue and other losses that cannot easily be attributed to individual 
                                                 
28 Landes and Posner 1975, op.cit (note 18), p.31. 
29  S. Shavell, ‘The judgement proof problem’,(6) International Review of Law and Economics, p. 43-58. 
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victims. Since potential plaintiffs are driven only by the private gains and expenses of their 
claims, they will have insufficient incentives to invest in detecting and litigating meritorious 
cases. In addition, a system of private enforcement creates a ‘free riding’ problem. Every vic-
tim of a law infringement has an interest to leave the enforcement efforts to other victims, so 
that profits can be obtained without having to spend own resources. The free riding problem 
will reduce the number of private actions below the level of enforcement that would be so-
cially optimal.  
 
If private interests and social interests do not coincide, private parties will have no incentive 
to bear enforcement costs even if this would be in the public interest. As indicated by Shavell, 
the possibility of financial reward coupled with the desire to avoid future harm and the re-
tributive motive (the desire to see people who have acted wrongly suffer sanctions) may cre-
ate a set of incentives sufficient to induce people to report the information they possess about 
wrongdoers.30 However, the size of these private benefits will vary across different fields of 
law and will not always generate optimal law enforcement efforts. Again, in a typical tort 
case, the private benefits from successfully suing a wrongdoer will be identical with the so-
cial benefits. If a house burns down in a fire caused by negligent behaviour of a tortfeasor, 
the value of this house is lost for society as a whole. The private loss equals the social loss.31 
Conversely, rules of safety law protect the private interests of individual parties but are also 
indispensable for avoiding larger social losses. Individual victims will have insufficient in-
centives to report infringements of safety protection laws, if their private benefits are lower 
than the social losses resulting from an overall reduction of safety and security.  
 
Several causes may explain why individual victims will not spend optimal efforts on en-
forcement of safety rules. The financial reward will be small if the loss consists of trivial 
damages; in such a case the costs of the law suit typically exceed the expected compensation. 
The financial reward will be non-existent if the law infringer is insolvent. The costs of private 
damages actions may be higher than the expected benefits if the law infringement can be as-
sessed only with great difficulty, such as in the case of violation of technically complex 
safety rules. In cases where the harm is already suffered, the desire to avoid future damage 
may not provide incentives because of the free riding effects generated by private enforce-
ment. Why would an individual victim bring a claim against a polluting factory to stop dan-
gerous emissions and avoid harm to other private parties who do not bear (a part of) the fi-
nancial burden of the enforcement action? Finally, the retributive motive does not seem suffi-
cient to compensate the above shortcomings of private damages actions. 
 
3.3. Group action as a potential remedy to the inefficiencies of private enforcement 
 
Before concluding that private damages actions are a defective enforcement mechanism for 
sanctioning infringements of safety rules and jumping to public enforcement, one should in-
vestigate whether adaptations of the institutional legal framework for private enforcement 
may overcome the existing inefficiencies.32 More in particular, private incentives to sue in-
                                                 
30  Shavell 1993, op.cit (note 4). 
31  An exception are claims for compensation of pure economic losses. If electricity supply is cut off for a num-
ber of hours due to negligent behaviour of a contractor charged with repair works, bars and restaurants in the 
affected area will have to close and will loose business. Since consumers will go to different places to have a 
drink or enjoy a dinner, the value of this business is not lost but simply moves to competing traders. In the 
latter example, private losses and social losses are not equal.  
32  See also W. van Boom, Efficacious Enforcement in Contract and Tort, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 
2006. 
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fringers may be influenced by creating the possibility of group actions. Group action schemes 
can take two different forms: i) either collective actions, allowing a group of victims to have 
their collective interests protected in a single claim brought on behalf of the entire group, or 
ii) representative actions brought by associations, which represent their members or may act 
also on behalf of non-identified victims. The question arises whether group actions may over-
come the aforementioned problems. First, it should be investigated to what extent a group 
action may cure the information deficiencies with respect to law infringements. Second, it 
must be examined whether group actions may solve the rational apathy problem. Third, one 
should look for the type of group action which best overcomes the free-riding problem.  
 
There are several ways in which group actions could solve, or at least diminish, the informa-
tion deficiencies. In this respect, one must distinguish between collective actions and repre-
sentative actions. Under opt-in schemes, victims must be appropriately notified about the oc-
currence of an infringement that has caused harm to them. Economically speaking, the value 
of the information provided is higher than the costs of the notification if it incites victims to 
initiate a group action to recover damages. Benefits resulting from the reduction of informa-
tion asymmetries may be particularly large in the case of representative actions. Associations 
may more easily acquire specialized knowledge regarding the applicable laws than individu-
als, so that they are better able to assess whether a certain behaviour constitutes an infringe-
ment. Obviously, there still will be an information asymmetry regarding possible infringe-
ments in as far as they are not easily detectable. Detection requires monitoring and supervi-
sion, which is costly. For individual victims these costs are almost by definition insurmount-
able but associations might acquire adequate funding for such investigations by charging their 
members a membership fee or by means of sponsoring. Thanks to group actions economies 
of scale can be achieved. It is more expensive for individual victims to investigate possible 
infringements in their own separate cases than for a group of victims, who jointly initiate le-
gal proceedings. The achievable economies of scale are larger under an opt-out scheme than 
under an opt-in scheme, since the number of harmed victims reached will be larger. Econo-
mies of scale are even more important if the investigation is done by an association which can 
monitor potential wrongdoers more regularly.  
 
Group actions may also mitigate the rational apathy of individual victims and the free-riding 
problem. First, group actions allow compensation of the losses of an entire group of harmed 
victims. This increases the number of lawsuits, because the expected net benefit will be 
higher than in the case of an individual claim. After all, the costs of the lawsuit decrease 
while the probability of winning the suit (and thereby the expected utility as well) increases if 
multiple plaintiffs have larger financial means, enabling them to have better access to evi-
dence and get better legal advice. The problem of rational apathy is therefore reduced. Sec-
ond, group actions spread the risk of uncertainty over a large number of affected victims. The 
financial effects of losing the case are spread over all individuals participating in the collec-
tive action, so that each individual only bears a small amount if the case is lost. People are 
better able to bear a small loss than a larger loss, so that the barriers to start a lawsuit are low-
ered. This will increase the number of claims brought in courts. Third, the free-riding prob-
lem can be overcome if those who benefit from a successful collective action are forced to 
contribute to its costs. Collective actions initiated by associations mitigate the free-rider prob-
lem, in as far as the association is able to charge its members a fee for the costs incurred.  
 
Even though collective actions may improve information flows, cure rational apathy of indi-
vidual victims and overcome the free-riding problem, these advantages also come at a cost. 
There are two main disadvantages: i) principal-agent problems, which result from informa-
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tion asymmetries on the side of victims inhibiting them to control the quality of the perform-
ance of the representing (association’s) advocate, and ii) the risk of opportunistic behaviour, 
which may lead to frivolous suits. These problems have materialized with US class actions 
and have often led European policy-makers to argue against the introduction of collective ac-
tions. It is well known from the literature on the regulation of the legal profession33 that cli-
ents (principals) face great difficulties in controlling the quality of the performance of the 
lawyers (agents). Information asymmetries exist which make it difficult or even impossible 
for the client to assess the quality of the lawyer’s work. In individual cases, the client has an 
immediate interest so that he may try to monitor his lawyer’s efforts to a certain extent. In 
collective actions, however, the plaintiffs’ interests are often too small to undertake any 
monitoring activities. In American class actions the attorney thus becomes the leading actor 
of the case and may pursue his private interests to the detriment of the harmed group of vic-
tims as a whole. The principal-agent problems may be exacerbated by the way in which the 
collective action is funded. Even though contingency fees may allow financing the costs of 
the suit (and thus improve access to justice), they may reduce the attorneys’ efforts below the 
optimal level and may lead to early settlements that are disadvantageous for the clients. The 
American experience also shows that class actions may be initiated to inflict reputational 
harm on companies. Firms may prefer an early settlement if this costs them less than the sum 
of the losses of handling the case in court. The size of these losses creates scope for abuses if 
the amount of damages to be paid by the company is lower than the costs of defending itself 
in court. This can even happen if the class attorney is certain that (s)he will lose the case, be-
cause the costs of the defendant of going to court (e.g. legal fees and reputational harm) 
might outweigh the settlement amount. 
 
3.4.  Examples of group actions in Europe, especially in the Netherlands 
 
When looking at the legal possibilities for collective actions in Europe, it is noticeable that 
most countries do not open the possibility for a collective action for damages. Even though in 
many countries private associations or public bodies have been granted standing so that they 
can bring a representative action, these rights are often limited to file for an injunction, or a 
declaratory decision regarding the unlawfulness of the defendants’ behaviour. In Germany, 
unlawfully obtained profits can be disgorged in a collective action. In the United Kingdom, 
collective actions for damages are available. In addition, specified bodies (allowed by the 
Secretary of State) are permitted to bring representative follow-on actions for infringement of 
competition law before the Competition Appeal Tribunal.34 In Belgium, Finland,35 Denmark 
and Italy, proposals pertaining to representative collective action for damages have been 
submitted. In Sweden, collective actions for damages have been possible since 2003. Prereq-
uisites are that the facts are identical and that it is sensible to decide the disputes in a single 
trial. An opt-in scheme has been chosen to form the group.36 The Dutch situation bears some 
resemblance to an opt-out damages group action, and will be described in more detail.  
                                                 
33  For an overview, see F. Stephen and J. Love, ‘Regulation of the legal profession’, in: B. Bouckaert and G. De 
Geest (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Volume III. Regulation of Contracts, Cheltenham, Ed-
ward Elgar 2000, p. 987-1017. 
34  Article 47B of the Competition Act 1998. See Office of Fair Trading, ‘Private Actions in Competition Law: 
Effective Redress for Consumers and Business’, Discussion Paper April 2007.  
 < http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft916.pdf> 
35  The proposal has met strong opposition from business pressure groups. See K. Viitanen, ‘Enforcement of 
consumers’ collective interests by regulatory agencies in the Nordic countries’ in: W. van Boom and M. Loos 
(Eds.), Collective Consumer Interests and How they Are Served Best in Europe. Legal aspects and Policy Is-
sues on the Border between Private Law and Public Policy, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing  2007. 
36  Idem. 
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In the Netherlands, a foundation or association with full legal capacity can institute an action 
intended to protect similar interests of other persons to the extent that its articles promote 
such interests. The organisation has standing only if it has made a sufficient attempt to 
achieve the objective of the action through consultations with the defendant. The organisa-
tions cannot sue for damages regarding losses of the members of the group. However, the 
group action can result in a declaratory decision regarding the unlawfulness of the defen-
dants’ behaviour, which can be used in subsequent individual damages procedures. Further-
more, the individual plaintiffs can authorize the organisation to collect the compensatory 
damages. If not all plaintiffs are traceable or if more plaintiffs are likely to turn up in the fu-
ture, these solutions are inadequate from a deterrence point of view. This problem was ad-
dressed in the following way. A defendant who has entered into a contract regarding the 
compensation of damages with a foundation or association possessing full legal capacity, 
may request (jointly with the foundation or association) that the contract is declared binding 
by the court upon persons to whom the damage has been caused. The contract has to include 
a description of the group(s) of persons in whose favour the contract has been entered into, 
the number of persons belonging to this group, the compensation awarded to these persons 
(based on the group they belong to, i.e. damage scheduling) and the conditions with which 
these persons must comply to be eligible for compensation. Before it can declare the contract 
binding, the court has to assess the reasonableness of the amounts, the way in which the com-
pensation can be received, whether the foundation or association is truly representative of 
consumers’ interests and the financial security posed. If the contract is declared binding, vic-
tims will receive the agreed amount and they are bound to the contract as if they have entered 
into it themselves. Victims who do not want to be bound by the contract can opt-out within a 
certain period of at least three months after a public announcement of the intended declara-
tion.  
 
To some extent, the Dutch solution seems well in line with the insights from the Law and 
Economics literature. First, the fact that a representative organisation files the claim and en-
ters into consultations might solve the rational apathy problem, as well as the problem that for 
some externalities no individuals have standing. Who should file a claim for the general dete-
rioration of the environment or the extinction of certain species, and who can sue on behalf of 
future generations? Second, the court evaluates the representativeness of the organisation and 
the organisation has to promote the interests at stake in its articles. This limits the principal-
agent problems. Furthermore, the organisation only has standing after it has tried to solve the 
problem through consultations. This tackles the problem of frivolous suits. Finally, in the pro-
cedure to declare the settlement contract binding, the court evaluates the settlement itself. 
This protects the interests of the group of victims. However, the Dutch solution requires co-
operation from the defendant, because the settlement contract can only be declared binding 
upon a joint request from the organisation and the defendant. Absent the approval of the de-
fendant, collective damages actions therefore are not possible in the Netherlands, and indi-
vidual procedures are still needed. In as far as it is the exact threat of a damages class action 
that induces the defendant to settle, the Dutch system might turn out to be a toothless lion.37 
Another possible problem is created by the opt-out possibility, which still enables free-riding 
behaviour. 
 
 
                                                 
37  However, in the Dutch DES-case a settlement was reached between the defendants and the representative 
organization, and this settlement subsequently was declared binding. See Hof Amsterdam, June 1 2006, Ned-
erlandse Jurisprudentie 2006, 461. 
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3.5.  Hybrid solutions and self-regulation 
 
It follows from the above analysis that public enforcement may be superior to private en-
forcement in terms of deterrence, because public agencies have better information about the 
violation of safety rules and the rational apathy problem reduces the number of private dam-
ages actions below the socially optimal level. Collective actions may overcome the ineffi-
ciencies of private enforcement to some extent but cause problems of their own. This may 
lead to the development of ‘hybrid’ solutions, which combine characteristics of private en-
forcement and regulation with public enforcement. 
 
To mitigate the problems of individual collective actions and representative actions by asso-
ciations, these claims may be subjected to a number of conditions and limitations. Contin-
gency fees may be prohibited and replaced by a fixed fee set by a governmental authority. To 
combat inadequate settlements, a preliminary test of the merits of the case38 may be intro-
duced or a judicial review of settlements may be required. However, courts may lack the in-
formation to be able to properly monitor the lawyer.39 To overcome the free-rider problem, 
the costs of class actions could be borne by the state. Finally, to guarantee that consumer as-
sociations are really representative, a number of requirements regarding their credibility, 
reputability and commitment to acting in the collective interests of consumers may be fixed. 
Standing may be given only to consumer associations approved by a governmental body or 
by the courts for a particular case or cases. Furthermore, regulations may impose require-
ments regarding the possibilities of members to actually control the decisions of the associa-
tion. In the end, all these measures boil down to a ‘regulation’ of private damages actions. 
Consequently, the differences between private enforcement and public enforcement become 
smaller. If public law-like rules are necessary to overcome the inefficiencies of private en-
forcement mechanisms, the logical question arises whether these ‘hybrid’ systems are prefer-
able to enforcement by public law agencies.  
 
Finally, the role of self-regulation should be briefly discussed. The Law and Economics lit-
erature40 has shown that self-regulation may have a number of advantages compared to pub-
lic regulation: i) self-regulatory agencies have better information about the markets to be con-
trolled; ii) there may be a high degree of self-compliance if the rules are set by the industry 
itself rather than by a distant public authority; iii) self-regulation may be more flexible and 
more innovative; and iv) the costs of self-regulation are borne by the industries themselves. 
But also self-regulation is not without disadvantages: i) the rules may lack democratic legiti-
macy and ii) self-regulation may be abused for anti-competitive purposes. Consequently, also 
self-regulation must take place within an institutional framework that allows to profit from its 
advantages while at the same time limiting its disadvantages. In the field of safety regulation, 
the information advantages of self-regulation will be considerable if highly technical stan-
dards are to be set and enforced. Self-regulatory rules may fully profit from the information 
advantages on the side of the regulated industries and may be more easily adapted if technol-
                                                 
38  R. Bone and D.S. Evans, ‘Class certification and the substantive merits, (51) Duke Law Journal 2002, p. 
1251-1332; G.P. Miller, ‘Review of the merits in class action certification’, ExpressO Preprint Series, Paper 
262 2004, <http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1654&context=expresso>. 
39  For an example see C. Silver, ‘Class actions – Representative proceedings’, in: B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest 
(Eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume V. The Economics of Crime and Litigation, Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar 2000, p. 215. Also see G.P. Miller, ‘Class Actions’, in: P. Newman (Ed.), The New Pal-
grave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. Volume 1, London: Macmillan Reference Limited 1 998, p. 259. 
40  J. Miller, ‘The FTC and voluntary standards: maximizing the net benefits of self-regulation’, (4) The Cato 
Journal 1985, p. 897-903; A. Ogus, ‘Rethinking self-regulation’, (15) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1995, 
p. 97-108. 
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ogy changes. Also, firms may more easily comply with rules enacted by the industry itself. 
This, in turn, may lower costs of monitoring and enforcement. On the negative side, self-
regulation may create scope for regulatory capture and anti-competitive effects.  
 
4. Timing of the enforcement measures 
 
Enforcement measures can differ with respect to their timing. For example, tort damages by 
definition follow after harm has occurred, whereas injunctions avoid the occurrence of harm 
in the first place. Generally speaking, enforcement measures can be applied at three possible 
stages: 
First, preclusionary measures take place at the earliest possible stage by directly avoiding the 
externality from occurring. For example, a new factory that is not meeting the required envi-
ronmental standards is withheld a necessary permit so that it cannot start producing. Preclu-
sion occurs through the use of force or physical barriers, e.g. the factory is locked until the 
problem is solved. 
Second, act-based sanctions are applied after the norm violation, but before harm occurs or 
irrespective of whether it does. For example, a speeding motorist is fined, whether the speed-
ing caused losses or not. These measures are also labelled as input monitoring. 41
Third, harm-based sanctions are only applied after the occurrence of harm. Tort damages are 
a clear example. These sanctions are also labelled as output monitoring. 
 
The legal instruments described in section 2 differ with respect to timing. As already said, 
tort damages are harm-based, but an injunction is a preclusionary measure. Regulation makes 
use of all three forms. Withholding a permit is a preclusionary measure. Issuing fines for 
norm violations (not having proper fire exits, restaurants having a dirty kitchen, running a 
shop without the proper permits, et cetera) are act-based sanctions. If the costs of monitoring 
compliance are high, harm-based sanctions might be used. The occurrence of harm can pro-
vide information on possible wrongful behaviour, so that the additional information of harm-
occurrence is utilized. Criminal law also applies all three forms. Examples of act-based sanc-
tions are traffic fines (in as far as they are not dealt with administratively) for e.g. speeding, 
drunk driving or using a mobile phone while driving. Examples of harm-based sanctions are 
fines or imprisonment for e.g. burglary, assault or homicide. Preventive detention is a preclu-
sionary measure, and the fact that someone is detained for a previous crime also precludes 
him from committing other crimes. Also a recent Dutch draft bill42 that allows mayors and 
district attorneys to ban known hooligans from a certain area without interference by a court 
can be regarded as preclusion, if it is enforced by force. The same bill allows for criminal 
fines or imprisonment if the ban is neglected, which constitutes an act-based sanction. 
 
The optimal timing of enforcement measures is determined by a multitude of factors. First, if 
the possible sanctions to be imposed are small (in absolute terms or relative to the benefits of 
the wrongful behaviour), they might not deter the unwanted act, so that preclusion is the only 
real option. As the magnitude of the possible sanctions increases, act-based sanctions become 
available, and at even higher levels also harm-based sanctions are feasible.43 The possible 
                                                 
41  D. Wittman, ‘Prior regulation versus post liability: the choice between input and output monitoring’, (6) The 
Journal of Legal Studies 1977, p. 193 ff. 
42  Approved by the Cabinet on September 7, 2007. 
43  Shavell 1993, op.cit (note 4), p. 261 ff gives a clear numerical example: a wrongful act yields 50 in benefits 
for the actor. The maximum sanction is 100. The act causes losses with a 20% probability. There is a 30% 
chance (e.g. due to a low probability of being caught or being convicted) that an act-based sanction will be 
applied and if harm occurs, there is also a 30% probability that a harm-based sanction will be applied. The 
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magnitude is determined by the wealth of an actor (or with imprisonment by his remaining 
lifetime) and is limited by notions of fairness. Furthermore, the idea of marginal deterrence 
(i.e. the sanction should vary with the size of the externalities) provides an additional limita-
tion on the sanction. Of course, the expected sanction can also be raised by increasing the 
probability of sanctioning, but this causes additional monitoring costs.44 In cases of terrorism 
where the terrorist is willing to die (e.g. suicide bombers), preclusion is the only real option. 
This causes high monitoring costs, such as physical safety devices at e.g. airports, phone taps, 
monitoring of e-mail traffic, constant surveillance of suspects, et cetera. The resulting inva-
sion of privacy can be regarded as an additional cost. 
 
Costs of monitoring and enforcement, already briefly mentioned above, are a second relevant 
factor. If preclusion through force or physical measures is impossible or very difficult (e.g. 
because it would require constant monitoring of behaviour, so that if an actor is starting a 
wrongful act, an official can still physically prevent it), act-based or harm-based sanctions are 
needed. On the other hand, if preclusion is relatively cheap (e.g., fencing an area in which 
actors would otherwise dump toxic waste), sanctions are less attractive. If monitoring of be-
haviour is difficult, preclusion and harm-based sanctions are more attractive. And if it is dif-
ficult to establish a causal relation between harm and acts, preclusion or act-based sanctions 
are better. Harm-based sanctions have the advantage over act-based sanctions that they have 
to be applied less often. In cases where it is easier to check whether regulations are obeyed 
than whether harm is caused (e.g. determining the level of maintenance of oil tanks in ships 
might be easier than detecting an oil leak into the ocean), act-based sanctions are preferable. 
In the opposite situation (it is easier to determine if an accident was caused by a wrong turn, 
than to constantly check whether all drivers make correct turns), harm-based sanctions are 
superior. Innes argues that monitoring the care level reduces enforcement costs relative to 
monitoring for harm, because if not all careless behaviour leads to harm, the rate of monitor-
ing can decrease. This result, however, hinges upon the assumptions that in both situations, 
the maximum sanction is applied, and that monitoring costs for discovering harm are as high 
as monitoring costs of discovering norm violations. It is doubtful whether these assumptions 
are widely applicable.45
                                                                                                                                                        
expected act-based sanction then is 0.3*100 = 30 and the expected harm-based sanction is 0.3*0.2*100 = 6. 
The benefits of 50 exceed both expected sanctions. Only if the sanction is higher than 166.66 (act-based) or 
833.33 (harm-based) will they become effective, because only then the expected sanctions exceed 50. 
44  See e.g. A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, ‘The fairness of sanctions: some implications for optimal enforcement 
policy’, (2) American Law and Economics Review 2000, p. 232. 
45  R. Innes, ‘Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-ante regula-
tion’, (24) International Review of Law and Economics 2004, p. 31, 32. This author provides the following 
numerical example: a firm can choose between no care or care (which costs 20). With care, no accident will 
happen. Without care, there is a 40% accident probability. If an accident occurs, harm amounts to 100. The 
maximum sanction is also 100. Monitoring costs (to detect careless behavior or to detect harm) equal 20. If 
monitoring for harm, the government chooses an optimal monitoring rate of 50%, because the expected sanc-
tion for a careless firm then equals 40%*50%*100=20. Firms are then willing to take care, because that also 
costs 20. The government’s average monitoring costs amount to 50%*20=10. However, if the government 
would monitor for care instead of harm, a monitoring rate of 20% would suffice, because a careless firm then 
also faces an expected sanction of 20%*100=20. Average enforcement costs drop to 20%*20=4. On pp. 40 
ff., Innes discusses the possibility of free detection of accidents and argues that this free detection should be 
exploited as much as possible, but that for the not-freely detected accidents, the result still holds that monitor-
ing for care is more desirable. On pp. 44 ff., Innes discusses the situation where the maximum sanction when 
no harm is found is lower than when harm is found. He argues that a government can threaten that if it detects 
a norm violation, it will then monitor for harm, to be able to pursue a higher sanction. This induces firms to 
take care, so that no norm violations will be found. In our view, this line of reasoning resembles the general 
argument in the economic analysis of tort law that optimal negligence rules deter all negligence. However, it 
neglects the body of literature devoted to explaining why in fact, negligent behavior does occur. See, among 
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Third, if the actors themselves possess good information on the dangers of their behaviour, 
harm-based sanctions can provide good incentives to take the appropriate care measures. If 
they do not know about the dangers but they do know that certain behaviour is prohibited, 
act-based sanctions might work fine. If the actor knows neither of both facts, only preclusion 
can work, provided that the public enforcement authority possesses superior information re-
garding the true dangers. 
 
Changes in technology can affect the optimal timing. For example, a few decades ago the 
only remedy against football hooligans was to respond to them causing harm (such as injur-
ing other spectators or damaging the seats in the stadium). Use of surveillance cameras has 
made it easier to detect their undesired behaviour in an early stage, before harm has been 
caused. Recent developments, such as using face-recognition software at the entrance of a 
stadium, might even avoid the known hooligans to enter the stadium in the first place. In traf-
fic safety, the development of Intelligent Speed Adaptation opens the possibility to preclude 
speeding. A GPS system determines where a vehicle is located, and an onboard computer 
connected to a speed-limiting device makes sure that the vehicle cannot exceed the local 
speed limits or it warns the driver that (s)he is exceeding these limits. Furthermore, alcohol 
locks in cars might preclude drunk driving, so that a shift away from act-based (random alco-
hol tests) and harm-based (alcohol test after an accident) sanctions might occur. Finally, the 
use of satellites since April 2007 has dramatically increased the probability that oil spills on 
the ocean are detected, as compared to the use of airplanes. A next step will be the use of 
GPS-systems on board ships, so that it is directly clear which ship has caused the spill. 
 
5. Centralization or decentralization 
 
The fifth section of this paper briefly discusses the economic criteria that allow an informed 
choice of the most appropriate regulatory level.46 Besides the choice of the sanctions, the 
choice between public and/or private enforcement and decisions on the timing of the inter-
vention, this is an important additional policy issue in a multi-level system of territorial juris-
dictions, such as the European Union. Should legal rules be decided and enforced centrally, 
by the European authorities, or should decisions be taken at the Member States’ level (or by 
regional authorities within the Member States)? Some economic criteria point in favour of 
decision-making at lower levels of government: heterogeneity of preferences, decentralized 
knowledge and innovation. Other economic criteria indicate a preference for decision-making 
at the central level: scale economies, transaction cost savings, interstate externalities and the 
achievement of distributional goals.  On top of these criteria, it is important to analyze the 
likely outcome of the different types of regulatory competition that may emerge in decentral-
ized regulatory systems. Will regulatory competition initiate a ‘race to the bottom’ or will it 
lead to a ‘race to the top’?  By discussing the above criteria and analyzing the likely out-
comes of regulatory competition, better informed policy choices between decentralization 
and centralization become possible. As it will be shown below, the weighing of the different 
relevant decision factors may vary across different areas of safety law. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
others, Calfee and Craswell 1984, op.cit, (note 9); Cooter and Ulen 2004, op.cit (note 8), p. 339 ff and Shav-
ell 2004, op.cit (note 8), p. 224 ff. 
46 This section of the paper draws on the more extensive discussion of economic criteria favouring 
(de)centralization in: R. Van den Bergh, ‘Towards an institutional legal framework for regulatory competi-
tion in Europe’, (53) Kyklos 2000, p. 435-466 and W. Kerber, ‘Interjurisdictional competition within the 
European Union’, (23) Fordham International Law Journal 2000, p. 217-249. 
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A first major justification for decentralized decision-making is heterogeneity of preferences. 
A useful starting point for an economic analysis of decentralization is Tiebout’s seminal arti-
cle on the optimal provision of local public goods.47 Congestible public goods, which are 
consumed and financed in common, do not allow people with a variety of tastes to live side 
by side without difficulty. People can be better off if they cluster together in communities 
with others who have similar tastes. If people can freely move, they can ‘vote by feet’ and 
move to the community offering their preferred bundle of public goods. Since these goods are 
both non-rivalrous and non-excludable, they are not supplied in sufficient quantities in free 
markets. Safety itself is a school book example of a public good, even though it may be pri-
vatized by offering protection only to people paying for the safety services (club goods). Also 
legal rules on safety have characteristics of public goods.  Hence, Tiebout’s theory may be 
extended to competition between legal rules on safety. Enterprises and citizens may have het-
erogeneous preferences as to their desired level of safety, which is a function of the contents 
of safety laws and their enforcement. The more legislators compete, the more preferences 
may be satisfied. Decentralization enables legislators to choose those rules which best serve 
the goals preferred by the local population. Firms and individuals may ‘vote by feet’ and 
choose the jurisdiction, which in their view offers the best set of laws. 48  
 
Other economic arguments in favour of decentralized decision-making are decentralized in-
formation and learning processes. Decentralization becomes the more important the more 
necessary information for rule-making is available only at lower levels of government. Envi-
ronmental law provides an example. Not only preferences concerning the desired degree of 
environmental protection differ across regions but also knowledge of pollution problems 
(such as information on age of plants and atmospheric conditions) may be decentralized. 
Hence, a preference for decentralization follows from the need to cope with informational 
asymmetries between regulators and regulated firms. Decentralization is the more efficient 
the more valuable local information is for appropriate rule making and enforcement. Besides  
its ability to cure informational asymmetries, decentralization carries an important and related 
advantage. Competition between legal orders generates all the benefits of a learning process. 
Differences in rules allow for different experiences and may improve an understanding of the 
effects of alternative legal solutions to similar problems. This advantage relates both to the 
formulation of the substantive rules and their enforcement. Learning may be very important 
to set optimal safety and health standards and strengthen the case in favour of decentralized 
decision-making.  
 
Obviously, heterogeneity of preferences, decentralized information and learning processes 
are not the full story. Economic analysis also suggests a number of reasons in favour of cen-
tralization. Markets for legislation may fail in the same way as ordinary markets for goods or 
                                                 
47  C. Tiebout, ‘A pure theory of local expenditure’, (64) Journal of Political Economy 1956, p. 416-424. 
48  As it is the case with all economic models, Tiebout’s theory is valid only if a number of restrictive assump-
tions are satisfied: 
 - There must be a sufficiently large number of legislators.  In the European context, twenty-seven legisla-
tors offer a relatively wide range of legal options and European law may be added as a 28th choice. 
 -  There must be no information deficiencies. People must be able to understand the different legal rules, so 
that they can make well-informed choices. This is a strong assumption with respect to individuals who 
may face great difficulties in assessing the contents of divergent rules. In contrast, the requirement of per-
fect information will be more realistic for firms, which can hire experienced lawyers to assist them in 
shopping for the best legal regime. 
  -  There must be no interstate externalities, no scale economies or opportunistic behaviour of legislators. As   
it will be further explained below, these requirements are main arguments in favour of centralized deci-
sion-making and some form of harmonization of laws.  
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services do not generate efficient outcomes because of market imperfections. Consequently, 
the need to cope with externalities between legal orders is a major argument in favour of cen-
tralized decision-making. Centralization will also generate efficiencies when extending the 
size of the jurisdiction allows for the achievement of scale economies and transaction cost 
savings. These efficiency arguments will be elaborated on below. Besides efficiency argu-
ments, the wish to achieve a more equitable distribution of income may justify centralization. 
Privatization measures49 may be criticized because they do not guarantee equal access to 
safety services for each citizen, irrespective of his or her income level. Corrections of the 
market mechanism for equity reasons are best decided at the central level.  
 
Externalities between jurisdictions are a powerful argument in favour of centralized rule mak-
ing. If allocative efficiency is to be reached in a federal state, preferences for divergent na-
tional rules in any field of law may be satisfied only to the extent that both benefits and costs 
remain within the jurisdiction that enacted the rules. If EC Member States enact legal rules 
that are likely to cause negative externalities for other Community members, centralization 
may be needed to guarantee that the externalities are 'internalized'. The externality problem 
arises in many fields: air pollution is an obvious example. The problem is more pervasive, 
however, and occurs in all fields of safety law discussed in this paper (tort law, regulation, 
criminal law). Harm caused by tortfeasors may happen in different countries and national tort 
laws may not guarantee a full internalization of the negative externalities occurring outside 
the tortfeasor’s home state.50 Also the negative effects of criminal acts in different countries 
may require control by a central enforcement agency.  
 
Next, centralization may be defended because of scale economies or transaction cost savings. 
Scale economies may be important in the production of the information needed to formulate 
and/or enforce legal rules. Some information relevant to the entire European Community can 
be most efficiently provided by Community institutions. Uniform legal rules also maintain 
economies of scale in production and distribution arrangements. If diversity in safety rules 
prohibits firms from using the same production and marketing techniques in larger areas, 
scale economies may be lost. The ambitious Internal Market Programme has aimed at the re-
moval of technical barriers caused by divergence in national regulations. The savings result-
ing from this removal were estimated to be substantial, although different in magnitude 
across industries.  
 
Competition between legislators is often criticized because it would cause a race to the bot-
tom. When the European Commission proposes harmonization of laws, it usually refers to the 
need to prevent inequality of competitive conditions across the Member States. This fear may 
be rephrased in economic terms as the danger of prisoners' dilemmas. States may operate, not 
in a market-like setting, but in a prisoners' dilemma game. When legislators can be analo-
gized to firms selling in a competitive market, decentralized rules may be preferable. In con-
trast, when states compete under prisoners' dilemma conditions, national rules will produce a 
result that is worse than a federal rule. Regulatory laxness may occur when substantive rules 
have to be enacted, and also at the implementation stage. A state will only gain in the struggle 
to attract business by choosing in favour of laxness, when other states do not act in the same 
way. However, if all other states follow, only the businesses will gain. The result of this pris-
oners' dilemma is a race to the bottom and centralization will then be required to generate ef-
ficient outcomes. One should be careful not to overestimate the importance of the ‘race to the 
                                                 
49 See the discussion section 2.3 in fine. 
50 See R. Van den Bergh and L. Visscher, The principles of European tort law: the right path to harmonization?, 
(14) European Review of Private Law 2006, p. 518-519. 
 20
bottom’ argument. Theoretically, both a race to the bottom and a race to the top may be pos-
sible. Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether regulatory competition leads to the top, 
to the bottom, or nowhere. So far, the empirical evidence supporting a race to the bottom in 
particular fields of law is limited. Therefore, the effects of competition should be analyzed 
very carefully before any conclusion on the desirability of either decentralization or centrali-
zation can be reached. 
 
6. The rational choice model: limits and challenges 
 
The rational choice model adopted in the economic analysis of law is subject to two types of 
criticisms. First, it is argued that criminal actors may behave irrationally, so that the goal of 
deterrence will not be achieved. In this respect, terrorism is advanced as a prime example. 
Second, the rational choice model is challenged by an alternative approach. Compliance 
strategies are presented as better instruments to reduce law infringements than deterrence 
strategies. Both points will be discussed in turn. 
 
6.1. Is the rational choice model useful to deter terrorism?  
 
Terrorism in general, and suicidal terrorism in particular, is widely seen as irrational behav-
iour. If this view is correct, the rational choice model would not be adequate to deter terrorist 
crimes. However, economists do not abandon their methodological approach that easily. They 
argue that the theory of optimal deterrence remains useful for policy decisions to combat ter-
rorism, even though some adaptations of the rational choice model may be necessary to ac-
count for the peculiar preferences of particular terrorists. Caplan51 distinguishes between 
three classes of terrorists: sympathizers, active terrorists and suicidal terrorists. He makes a 
further distinction between three types of irrationality. In applied economics, rationality im-
plies that individuals respond to incentives (by buying less goods if the price increases), that 
they pursue their self-interest and have rational expectations, implying that their beliefs are 
correct on average. Sympathizers, who favour terrorism, are rational in all three senses of the 
word: they respond to incentives, their behaviour is close to narrow self-interest and they 
mostly have rational expectations. Also active terrorists and suicidal terrorists respond to in-
centives. They do not assume high risks for their own sake and use riskier tactics only when 
they are more effective (for example, they will abandon traditional attacks if the apprehension 
rate is high). However, active terrorists and suicidal terrorists arguably do not match the as-
sumptions of narrow self-interest and rational expectations. Terrorists may take self-
destructive decisions and hold many systematically mistaken beliefs.  Clearly, deviations 
from the rational choice model are greatest in the case of suicide attacks. Whereas active ter-
rorists may be motivated by financial rewards for their families or may wish to take revenge, 
suicide bombers are probably self-destructive. Also, active terrorists may decide to buy less 
irrationality when the price rises; there are not many volunteers to commit a suicide attack. 
However, suicidal terrorists do not buy less irrationality when the price increases and prefer 
to die rather than doubt their world view. If these more refined notions of rationality are used, 
the conclusion is that deterrence remains a viable anti-terrorism strategy. In addition, ob-
served deviations from rational expectations create scope for non-orthodox responses, such as 
propaganda or ‘cheap talk’ and appeasement or ‘cheap action’. Irrational persons may be per-
suaded by rhetorically targeting feelings rather than facts. If cheap concessions may neutral-
ize a dangerous world view, appeasement may be a cheap way to reduce terrorism.52
                                                 
51 B. Caplan, ‘Terrorism: the relevance of the rational choice model’, (128) Public Choice 2006, p. 91-107. 
52  Idem, 102-104 
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Garoupa, Klick and Parisi have carried out a Law and Economics analysis of optimal en-
forcement regarding terrorism. In as far as terrorists respond to the incentives provided by 
criminal law, it is argued that the sanctions should be relatively severe, due to the often large 
externality that is caused, the relative low apprehension rates and the fact that terrorists on 
average are wealthier than other categories of criminals.53  If terrorists do not care about pos-
sible imprisonment or even death penalty, increasing the probability and/or magnitude of the 
sanction will have no effect. Under such circumstances, as it is likely the case with suicidal 
terrorists, it might be better to target the terrorist organization, e.g. by freezing bank accounts 
and confiscate property, so that the terrorists are cut off from their funds.54 Furthermore, the 
authors argue that the group or family to whom the (potential) terrorist belongs might be tar-
geted with group liability, because the group members are better able to monitor and control 
the terrorist.55 This can obviously work only if the group or family is not supporting the ter-
rorist, or if it is susceptible to the threat of possible sanctions imposed on the group. Individu-
als within the group or family who are uninformed about the activities might become in-
formed about this when they are faced with group liability, and they might therefore increase 
monitoring efforts in the future to avoid additional wrongdoing.56 Finally, the fact that terror-
ists are often part of an organization makes it possible to target incentives at other individuals 
within the organization. The terrorist may not care about imprisonment, but the people who 
provide financial support might. Also, the fact that terrorist acts often involve more than one 
individual enables to create distrust by instruments such as plea-bargaining, or leniency pro-
grams for ‘whistleblowers’.57
 
6.2. Compliance strategies as an alternative to deterrence strategies 
 
It must be noted that deterrence strategies based on the rational choice model is not the only 
possible approach to improve the enforcement of safety norms. Instead of deterring actors 
from norm violations by the use of sanctions, it is also possible to try to induce them to com-
ply with the applicable norms by informing them about the norms, giving advice how to 
adapt to the norms, giving warnings instead of applying sanctions when violations are ob-
served and only revert to sanctions if the other approaches yield no success. This approach is 
known as compliance strategies. Burby and Paterson argue that compliance strategies are bet-
ter where regulations are adopted to achieve performance standards, while deterrence strate-
gies are superior in obtaining compliance with specification standards as well as in situations 
where the costs of compliance clearly outweigh any direct benefits to the actor involved.58 
Suurmond has analyzed the compliance approach regarding Dutch fire safety regulation.59 
The research was conducted on the basis of visits to and interviews with thirteen municipali-
ties’ enforcement officials. Suurmond concludes that the scope for compliance strategies is 
rather limited and that a shift towards a more deterrent enforcement strategy is desirable.  
 
                                                 
53  N. Garoupa, J. Klick and F. Parisi, ‘A law and economics perspective on terrorism’, (128) Public Choice 
2006, p. 156. 
54  Idem, p. 148. 
55  Idem, p. 149. 
56  Idem, p. 152. 
57  Idem, p. 155. 
58  R.J. Burby and R.G. Paterson, ‘Improving compliance with state environmental regulations’, (12) Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management 1993, p. 765, 766. 
59  G. Suurmond, ‘Compliance to fire safety regulation: explaining the influence of the enforcement style’, Pa-
per for the 24thAnnual Conference of the European Association in Law and Economics in Frederiksberg, 
Denmark 2007, < www.cbs.dk/content/download/67268/930124/file/Guido%20Suurmond.pdf >. 
 22
Nyborg and Telle have executed a game theoretical analysis of the enforcement of Norwe-
gian environmental regulation. After a norm violation is detected, firms receive a warning 
and they only face prosecution if they fail to comply after the warning. Why would a violator 
comply in the first place, if he knows that he will get a second chance anyway? Would a de-
terrence approach not provide stronger incentives to comply? According to the authors, the 
regulator’s ability to impose sanctions on individual violators is decreasing with the number 
of violators, due to constraints on the budget for prosecution costs. The same line of reason-
ing holds for the social disapproval connected to norm breaking. Once the number of viola-
tors exceeds a critical level, the sanction becomes insufficient to deter violations.60 Below 
this critical level, all firms want to comply. Above it, all firms want to violate. The regulator 
‘loses control’ if more than the critical number of firms, either deliberately or by mistake, 
violates the norms.61 A warning to a firm that mistakenly violates the norms, instead of sanc-
tioning it, can be seen as a device that reduces the probability of losing control. After all, a 
firm that by mistake violates the norms can correct its behaviour, so that after the warning 
fewer firms violate than without the warning. The probability that the critical number of vio-
lating firms is reached therefore decreases. However, this result only holds under the assump-
tion of compliance consisting of fixed costs that have to be spent per time period, and of posi-
tive verification costs imposed on those who only comply after the warning. Under those as-
sumptions, it is never cheaper for firms to reduce their costs by simply delaying compliance 
until after having received a warning. However, if compliance can easily be ‘switched on and 
off’ with no or low costs, or if net verification costs are negative so that it actually pays to 
delay compliance, warnings might not help. Furthermore, if the detection probabilities are 
small, the conclusions also do not hold.62  In our view, many of the violations that Suurmond 
discusses are exactly of this last nature. In the case of fire safety regulation, it is relatively 
easy to switch compliance on and off (removing tables or beer crates from the fire exit before 
the inspection and putting them back after the inspection, not allowing too many people in the 
establishment, being careful with candles, ash-trays, and so on), the probability of detection is 
relatively low (the inspections are announced or even take place on appointment, and only 
once or twice a year) and costs can be saved by waiting with compliance until after a warning 
is given (for example, postponing the costs of annual certification of fire extinguishers).  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The risk society faces an increasing demand for more safety and security but government re-
sources are inevitably limited both with respect to the enactment of new substantive legal 
rules on safety and the enforcement of these rules. An economic approach provides useful 
insights on how dangerous acts may be avoided and on the optimal level of law enforcement. 
Three basic policy decisions must be made: the choice of the sanction, the choice between 
public and/or private enforcement and the timing of the enforcement measures. An additional 
choice in a (quasi-) federal system relates to the optimal government level of enforcement: 
should enforcement measures be decided centrally or at lower levels of government (decen-
tralization)? By using the rational choice model, economic analysis provides useful insights 
for improving the quality of the policy choices to be made. 
 
                                                 
60  K. Nyborg and K. Telle, ‘The role of warnings in regulation: keeping control with less punishment’, (88) 
Journal of Public Economics 2004, p. 2802, 2803. 
61  Idem, p. 2808. 
62  Idem, p. 2813. 
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A lack of adequate safety measures causes negative externalities to society at large. These 
externalities may be internalized by different legal instruments, which use different types of 
sanctions.  
Tort law imposes injunctions or forces wrongdoers to pay damage compensation; regulation 
makes use of administrative fines; criminal law allows the imposition of criminal fines and 
the sanction of imprisonment. Optimal enforcement measures in each of these categories will 
reduce the number and severity of violations of safety rules. A rule of strict liability mini-
mizes the accident costs by providing incentives to adopt efficient care measures and choose 
an optimal activity level. A negligence rule minimizes accident costs by providing incentives 
to choose efficient care, provided that courts set the level of due care equal to efficient care. 
In a unilateral accident situation (where the victim has no impact on the expected losses), a 
rule of strict liability is superior since it also provides incentives to optimally decrease the 
level of dangerous activities. It is important to stress that efficient outcomes will be reached 
only if damages equal the size of the actual losses (strict liability) or are sufficiently high to 
induce optimal care (negligence). In this respect, three problems emerge. First, the probability 
of a ‘conviction’ (duty to pay compensation) may be too low due to uncertainty and rational 
apathy. Punitive damages may mitigate this problem. Second, tortfeasors may be ‘judgment 
proof’. If their assets are lower than the size of the losses, vicarious liability of principals may 
be considered but monitoring costs of this solution may be high. Third, immaterial losses 
(pain and suffering, loss of life) tend to remain undercompensated. 
Compared to sanctions under tort law, administrative fines are imposed ex ante before the 
occurrence of harm; they are also more flexible since their size must not equal the magnitude 
of the loss. Regulation is superior to tort law if the government has better information than 
private parties and the judge. Regulation also allows achieving scale economies. Conversely, 
regulation may suffer from shortcomings if its contents are determined by pressure groups, 
and decision-makers are victims of regulatory capture.  
Criminal sanctions should provide incentives to minimize the total costs of crimes. These 
consist of the negative externalities thrown upon society minus the gains to the offenders, the 
costs of apprehension and conviction, the supply of crimes (which is dependent on the prob-
ability and severity of the sanctions) and the costs of punishment. A major advantage of 
criminal fines is their greater deterrent effect. Imprisonment also offers a solution for the 
judgment proof problem, even though it should remain an exceptional sanction (principle of 
marginal deterrence).  
 
Tort law, regulation and criminal law all differ with respect to the costs of formulating safety 
rules and the enforcement costs of their sanctions. Tort law is relatively cheap: use may be 
made of open norms that need to be specified only ex post if harm occurs and monitoring 
costs are low. Conversely, regulation entails higher costs of formulating norms. Regulation 
also carries the risk of inconsistencies and monitoring costs tend to be high, because of con-
trols that take place ex ante.  Finally, enforcement costs are highest under criminal law. This 
is due in particular to the costs of imprisonment and the damage caused by judicial errors that 
need to be prevented by means of special safeguards. 
 
Economic analysis also provides criteria to enable an informed choice between public and 
private enforcement. Optimal private enforcement requires that private parties possess perfect 
information on the occurrence and seriousness of law infringements and that the private in-
terest to sue in court coincides with the social interest in preventing infringements. Public en-
forcement will be a superior strategy if public enforcement agencies have an information ad-
vantage over private parties and when the private motives to bring suits are not identical with 
the social benefits of court proceedings. The challenge for policy makers is to design an op-
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timal mix of public and private enforcement. In a typical tort case, victims have sufficient 
information on the occurrence and the size of the harm. This may be different in case of vio-
lation of safety norms that are more difficult to discover and assess. In the latter case, the pri-
vate motive to bring suit may be insufficient because of rational apathy and the free-riding 
problem. Collective actions and/or representative actions may (partly) overcome the above 
problems but pose difficulties of their own.  
 
With respect to the timing of the enforcement measures, a distinction can be made between 
preclusionary measures, act-based sanctions and harm-based sanctions. The first category in-
cludes preventive detention or the withholding of permits for exercising dangerous activities. 
Fines imposed before harm occurs or irrespective of whether it does are act-based and can be 
characterized as a form of input monitoring. Damages are a harm-based sanction that may be 
seen as a form of output monitoring. Different factors have an impact on the choice of the 
most timely sanction: the size of the sanctions, the costs of monitoring and enforcement and 
the information on risks. The following examples illustrate these insights. If small act-based 
or harm-based sanctions do not sufficiently deter, preclusion may be the only option. If it is 
easier to check whether regulations are obeyed that whether harm is caused, act-based sanc-
tions are preferable. If actors are sufficiently aware of dangers, harm-based sanctions may be 
considered. 
 
Economic analysis is also useful to inform the debate about the most appropriate level for 
decision-making and enforcement measures in a multilevel system of jurisdictions. Heteroge-
neous preferences concerning safety, decentralized information about safety levels and learn-
ing processes are major arguments in favour of decentralization. Conversely, the need to in-
ternalize negative interjurisdictional externalities, the achievement of scale economies and 
the risk of a race to the bottom may justify centralization. 
 
This paper also paid some attention to the limits and the challenges of the rational choice 
model. Using the example of terrorism, it is often questioned whether criminal actors behave 
rationally. To counter this criticism a distinction must be made between different classes of 
terrorists and different types of irrationality. Generally, the rational choice model remains 
useful even though subject to some adaptations. Moreover, sanctions may be targeted also at 
organizations or groups. The rational choice model is further challenged by an alternative 
model of compliance strategies. It is often argued that enforcement efforts may be more suc-
cessful if use is made of a ‘soft’ approach relying on information of infringers and persuading 
them to obey safety rules.  Game theory shows that warnings are not effective if compliance 
can be ‘switched on and off’ or if it pays to delay compliance. The Dutch case of fire safety 
regulation provides some empirical support for these theoretical predictions. 
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